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Technology Diffusion and the
Performance of American
Manufacturing: A Proposal for an
Industrial Extension Service
Frank Ostroff *
The purpose of this article is to propose an Industrial Extension Service mod-
eled upon the Agricultural Extension Service, and suggest how it might
effectively address certain fundamental problems hindering the performance of
the American manufacturing sector. Part I highlights some probable causes of
American manufacturing's declining relative performance. Part II discusses why
firms may adopt new technology more slowly than would be optimal. Part III
considers the model of the Agricultural Extension Service, pointing out those
features that make it attractive and those features that would have to be changed in
applying it to the industrial sector. Part III also describes early and partial experi-
ments to form such a service, and identifies their limitations. Part IV concludes
with an evaluation of the idea and recommends a basic framework for
implementation.
I. THE GENERAL PROBLEM
The ability of American manufacturing to compete in world markets is erod-
ing. The balance of trade in manufactured goods has shifted strongly against the
United States (U.S.) since the mid-1970s. As recent headlines attest, this trend
has worsened in the past two years. In a host of industries-electrical equipment,
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leather and rubber products, motor vehicles, numerically-controlled machine
tools, and many others-the share of the market held by U.S. companies de-
clined between 1965 and 1980.' The results of this decline have been felt on the
corporate bottom line. For much of the past decade, the return on manufacturing
assets has been below that on corporate bonds.'
Various explanations have been offered to account for these problems, includ-
ing an over-valued U.S. currency and non-competitive wage rates. However,
these explanations ignore a critical fact. Even with equivalently valued currencies
and equally priced inputs of labor and capital, many American manufactured
goods would still not be competitive internationally. For example, Japanese auto-
mobile manufacturers enjoy a $1500 landed cost advantage over American com-
panies in the production of similar cars. 3 Although lower wage rates constitute an
important part of the Japanese cost advantage, the Japanese require 20-25 per-
cent fewer hours of labor and significantly less capital than American firms to
build the same car.4 In steel, Japanese integrated mills enjoy as much as a $150
per ton cost advantage over their American counterparts.' Wage levels aside,
Japanese integrated steel mills are simply more efficient than U.S. plants, requir-
ing only 8.25 hours to produce a ton of steel, while those in the U.S. require 11.5
hours.
6
But efficiency and productivity advantages, by themselves, do not explain
enough. In some industries, quality of manufacture is the critical factor of com-
petitive success. Here again, the performance of American firms has been disap-
pointing. Japanese automobile manufacturers not only are more efficient than
U.S. companies, but usually turn out a higher quality product as well. 7 This
Japanese advantage is found in other industries. David Garvin recently found that
Japanese manufacturers of air conditioners had an assembly-line defect rate al-
most 70 percent lower than that of American manufacturers.' Manufacturers in
other countries have long recognized the importance of product quality. European
companies such as Volkswagen and Phillips, for example, have made product
quality a central part of their competitive strategy for many years. 9
There are, in fact, a number of strategic dimensions that can be critical to




I. For an exhibit showing a variety of industries in which world market share has been lost, see
Scott, National Strategy for Stronger U.S. Competitiveness, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at
80.
2. Id. at 77-78.
3. W. ABERNATHY, K. CLARK & A. KANTROW, INDUSTRIAL RENAISSANCE 63 (1983).
4. Id. at 59-63.
5. N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1984, at D4, col. 4.
6. Id.
7. W. ABERNATHY, supra note 3, at 63-67.
8. Garvin, Quality on the Line, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 66.
9. Leonard & Sasser, The Incline of Quality, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 163.
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(4) flexibility of product design
(5) aesthetic appearance
(6) pace of production.' 0
The dimension(s) upon which a firm should base its manufacturing strategy will
depend upon both the resources available to the firm and the competitive dynam-
ics of the industry as a whole. Any attempt to redress the problems of America's
manufacturers must consider both the capabilities of particular firms and the
competitive structure of involved industries.
New process technologies can lead to superior performance in manufacturing.
Studies by economists"l repeatedly point to the crucial role of technological
advance in both economic growth and productivity increases.12 Computer aided
design and computer aided manufacturing technology (CAD/CAM) increases
production efficiency by decreasing design and production time. Continuous
casting increases the production pace and decreases costs in the manufacture of
steel. Shuttleless looms and microprocessors increase production rates and effi-
ciency in both continuous and small-batch production of textiles.
Advanced process technologies can also improve manufacturing performance
in other ways. Shuttleless looms can offer significant increases in product quality.
CAD/CAM can increase flexibility in product design and product mix and de-
crease change-over costs. The particular capability of a technology which will be
most important, as well as the choice of technology which should be made, will
vary with the competitive characteristics of different industries.
Despite the importance of technological advance to competitive success, the
diffusion of new production technologies is lagging in many American indus-
tries. In 1981, 17 percent or less of the steel manufactured in the U.S. was
continuously cait, compared to 58 percent in Japan. 3 In a 1976 General Ac-
counting Office study, only 17 percent of the metalworking firms examined had
one or more numerically-controlled machine tools in use. 14 Use of automated
bonding equipment for integrated circuit assembly is much more widespread in
Japan than in the U.S. 5 The U.S. also lags far behind the Japanese in the
diffusion and use of industrial robots.
16
Mere use of advanced technologies does not guarantee superior performance.
Comparative studies of the U.S. and Japanese automobile industries conclude
10. Abernathy & Clark, Innovation: Mapping The Winds of Creative Destruction, Harv. Bus. Sch.
Working Paper, HBS 84-32, at 5; Skinner, The Factory of the Future-Always in the Future, in
TOWARDS THE FACTORY OF THE FUTURE 88 (American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1980).
11. See, e.g., C. FREEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION (2d ed. 1982).
12. I do not wish to over-emphasize, however, the role of technology. Obviously, there are a variety
of management areas and government policies that play an important part in determining the com-
petitive success of a nation's industries.
13. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1981, at 28, col. 1. Continuous casting technology had been commercially
available for over 15 years.
14. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY-A CHANGING CHALLENGE TO
IMPROVED PRODUCTIVITY 44 (1976). Numerically-controlled machine tools had been commercially
available for at least 15 years.
15. Pushing for Leadership in the World Market, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 14, 1981, at 62.
16. See CREATIVE STRATEGIES INT'L, ROBOTs AND REINDUSTRIALIZATION 267-71 (1982).
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that the way technology is managed-much more than the sheer level of tech-
nology-is what determines the Japanese competitive advantage. 17 Most Ameri-
can companies that install CAD/CAM or robots do not take advantage of the
flexible production capabilities of this new equipment. Instead, they use the
equipment to produce goods in long runs, much in the same way that they used
their older, dedicated machinery.
There are two changes necessary to improving the competitive ability of Amer-
ican manufacturing. The diffusion rate of new production technologies must be
increased. And the technologies that are adopted must be utilized in a strate-
gically effective manner.
II. CHANGING THE ADOPTION RATE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
To meet the challenge of improving manufacturing performance in the United
States, it is important to understand why firms may be slow to adopt new
technologies. This section of the paper presents three explanations of why firms,
following only the incentives of the market, may adopt new technology less
rapidly than the national interest in industrial competitiveness warrants. These
three explanations demonstrate that a new cooperative effort to promote the use
of production technologies may be necessary, and establish some criteria for an
effective promotional effort.
(1) Organizational resistance to change may slow the adoption rate of pro-
duction technologies. Adoption of technology almost always involves more than
insertion of knowledge into a pre-existing set of processes and organizational
relationships. 8 New technologies are often seriously disruptive of pre-existing
organizational structures. CAD/CAM technology, for example, requires workers
to develop new operating skills. Work sequences must be changed because of
altered production paths and faster production. New marketing skills must be
developed to take advantage of the enhanced capability for product customiza-
tion. Supplier relationships are disturbed because of reduced requirements for in-
process inventory. The value of existing managerial expertise is destroyed since
new procedures must be developed for allocating overhead. These are the kinds
of changes that are at the heart of Joseph Schumpeter's "theory of innovation and
economic development in which 'creative destruction' is the vehicle of
growth."' 9 However, there are enough points of resistance to all of these disrup-
tions within a firm to make successful change a difficult problem.
In order to overcome this resistance to change, two things are necessary. First,
strategies designed to promote organizational change should be used. Second,
business assistance must be given to the areas of the firm affected by the adoption
of new technology. Helping a machine shop develop a retraining program for
workers, for example, may ease adjustment to the use of CAD/CAM equipment.
(2) Characteristic shortcomings of small and medium-size firms may slow
17. W. Abernathy & K. Clark, Notes on a Trip to Japan, Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper, HBS
82-58, at 22.
18. Abernathy & Clark, supra note 10, at 7-10.
19. Id. at 9.
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the adoption rate of production technologies. Lack of understanding of the
capabilities of numerically-controlled equipment is second only to the cost of
capital as a barrier to increased use. 20 The lack of understanding of technology is
a particular problem for small and medium-size firms, many of which may be
unaware that a new technology even exists. Small firms employ only a small
percentage of the technical workforce in a sector (except in high technology
industries).21 This lack of technical capability can limit the ability of these firms
to find technical solutions to their problems, or to tap into federal research grants
and reports. The lack of technical personnel can also place smaller firms outside
of the "networks" of technical information (e.g., technical literature, con-
ferences) where firms become aware of new technologies. Given their relatively
scarcer technical resources, the technical personnel that small firms do have are
usually devoted to "day to day, technically oriented firm production problems
rather than ... the search for new technologies." 22 Even if smaller firms are aware
of the new technologies, they often do not have the research and development
capability to do the adaptive engineering and development necessary to make
effective use of available technologies given their specific business and technical
needs. 23 Finally, smaller firms often lack the management capacity to effectively
plan for, and take advantage of, the new capabilities of advanced process
technologies.
(3) Economic factors may also slow the adoption rate of production technol-
ogies. The "standard micro-economic model" to explain the adoption rate of
new innovations was developed by Mansfield in the early 1960s. It predicts that
the lower the profitability of a new innovation or the proportion of firms using the
innovation, the slower the rate of adoption of the innovation will be. In addition,
the larger the size of the investment (as a percentage of the total assets of the
firms), the slower the adoption rate of the innovation. The adoption rate of the
innovation will also vary across industries depending on: how competitive the
industry is, the attitude of the labor force toward innovation, the financial health
of the industry, and other factors.
Even if use of an innovation would be profitable for a firm, it may not be
perceived that way. Uncertainty concerning the technical feasibility of an innova-
tion may inhibit adoption. In addition, individual firms may be unable to evaluate
effects of an innovation on profitability, or be unnecessarily "risk-averse." There
is a strong incentive for such firms to wait and let other firms be the "guinea
pigs" in the adoption of new technologies.14 Unfortunately, many firms may wait
so long, that by the time they are willing to adopt a new technology, the oppor-
tunity for competitive advantage is lost.
A new cooperative effort to promote the use of new technologies could help
overcome these impediments. To be effective, this effort should increase infor-
20. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 14, at 45.
21. CENTER FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEV., FACILITATING FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO
SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED BUSINESSES AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 10 (1984).
22. Id.
23. id. at 11.
24. R. NELSON, M. PECK & E. KALACHEK, TECHNOLOGY ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC
POLICY 102-9 (1967)
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mation concerning new technologies and promote organizational change to over-
come the resistance of firms to their adoption and effective use. Attempts to
increase information should aim to increase technical understanding and
awareness of innovations, decrease uncertainty concerning technical feasibility
and effects on profitability, and aid adaption to the specific characteristics and
needs of firms. Business assistance for areas of the firm affected by the use of
new technology should also be given.
III. EFFORTS TO TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY
In response to the problem of lagging adoption of technology, a number of
people have proposed establishing an industrial extension service, modeled after
the successful Agricultural Extension Service,25 a strategy briefly attempted in
the 1960s. This section will look analytically at the Agricultural Extension Ser-
vice as a model for an industrial technology transfer mechanism. It will also look
at direct efforts to transfer industrial technology and describe some of their
achievements and limitations. Finally, this section will examine the current "in-
frastructure" of productivity organizations in the U.S. and identify some of the
areas where improvements are necessary.
A. The Agricultural Extension Service
The Agricultural Extension Service (AES) is probably the best known and
most successful effort in the United States to transfer technology to industry.
Studies of the great productivity increases of American agriculture almost all
point to the critical role played by the AES. 26 The AES model consists of three
main components: a research subsystem consisting of fifty state agricultural
experiment stations and the U.S Department of Agriculture; county extension
agents, who work with farmers at the local level; and state extension specialists
who link agricultural researchers and county agents.
27
The AES was established by the Smith-Lever Act of 1914.28 The support of the
railroads in the early 1900s was critical to the early successes of the Extension
movement, which preceded passage of the Act. The railroad operators, recogniz-
25. J. Herbert Holloman, formerly Japan Steel Industry Professor of Technology and Policy at MIT
and currently Director of the Center for Technology and Policy at Boston University, has been a
leading proponent of the idea of applying the Agricultural Extension Service model to other indus-
tries. See, e.g., Heaton & Hollomon, Diffusing Technical Knowledge: A National Imperative,
TECHNOLOGY REV., Oct. 1983, at 13; see also CENTER FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEV., supra note 21.
For a pessimistic view of applying ttie Agricultural Extension Service model to other industries, see
Rogers, Aveland & Bean, Extending the Agricultural Extension Model (Sept. 1976) (preliminary
draft).
26. See, e.g., Rogers, Aveland & Bean, supra note 25, at 45.
27. "[Tlhe researchers and extension specialists are located in state agricultural universities, and
have similar levels of expertise (both are usually Ph.D.s in agriculture). So the agricultural extension
model is actually an integrated system for the innovation-development process." E.M. ROGERS,
DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 159 (3rd ed. 1983).
28. Smith-Lever Act, Pub. L. No. 95, ch. 79, § 1, 38 Stat. 372 (1914) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§
341-48 (1976)).
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ing that an increasing percentage of rail shipments consisted of farm products,
saw a strong correlation between increased farm productivity and their own
prosperity. The railroad operators gave financial support for farm demonstra-
tions, distributed educational bulletins and presented exhibits of farm products.
The demonstration trains were particularly important; agricultural experts, usu-
ally from the land grant colleges, would travel the countryside, giving lectures
and demonstrating new farming techniques. In 1911, three years before the
Smith-Lever Act was passed, 62 trains carried 740 lecturers over 35,000 miles to
an audience of over one million people.
29
Today, there are over 15,000 employees of the Extension Service. Funding
comes from federal, state and county government and in 1975 totalled over $450
million. 30 In addition to its record of success, several features of the Agricultural
Extension Service make it attractive as a model for accelerating the adoption of
technology in other industries.
(1) The research subsystem provides a continuous source of new knowledge
which is useful to increasing productivity. There is a constantly expanding data
base of new technology and processes that extension agents can use to help
farmers improve production methods. Agents are kept abreast of new develop-
ments and have access to the research subsystem for technical solutions to partic-
ular problems that may arise.
(2) The Extension Service uses an active transfer system to convey informa-
tion about new technologies. Technology transfer mechanisms can be divided
into two basic modes: active systems in which active transfer agents, like county
agents, bring together researchers and clients, and passive systems in which the
user has sole responsibility for obtaining information through formal or imper-
sonal media.3' Passive systems have a few obvious advantages. Since they do
without the high labor overhead of active systems, they are relatively cheap to
operate and maintain. And with the advent of computer information processing,
users can theoretically find their way through the data bases of passive systems to
find solutions to their technical problems.32
For the purposes of accelerating adoption of new manufacturing technologies,
however, passive systems have significant drawbacks. First, the same lack of
technical expertise that keeps smaller, unsophisticated firms from introducing
new processes severely limits their ability to make use of passive information
systems. Some sort of technological "translator" is required to help smaller
firms understand new research developments. In the Agricultural Extension Ser-
vice, this "translator" function is taken up by the county extension agent, who
can confer with the state specialist on the more difficult problems. Passive sys-
tems, like the National Technical Information Service, usually depend upon the
user to adapt the information to his specific needs-again, something which is
29. J. Killacky, The Cooperative Extension Service: An Historical Overview 16 (April 1982)
(qualifying paper submitted to Harvard Univ. Graduate School of Education). This paragraph draws
heavily on pages 15-16 of Killacky's paper.
30. Rogers, Aveland & Bean, supra note 25, at 26, 30.
31. NAT'L SCIENCE FOUND., THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: REVIEWING THE
LITERATURE 164 (May 1983).
32. Id. at 164-65.
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beyond the capacity of many firms. Also, continual exchange of information
between the technical source and information seeker is usually required to ensure
that the correct problem is being addressed.3 3 Finally, the tendency of smaller
firms to devote their technical personnel to day-to-day operations limits their
ability to stay on top of information in technical data bases.
Numerous studies have confirmed that passive information systems do not
work well when evaluated by volume of technology adopted. Studies of various
technology sharing programs operated by NASA, the Department of Commerce,
and others all come to this conclusion.
34
Active systems, on the other hand, have distinct advantages in accelerating the
adoption of technology. Virtually all empirical studies have concluded that face-
to-face communication has a strong positive effect on technology dissemination
and adoption. 5 Some of the reasons for the superiority of active transfer systems
are the interpersonal "linkage" between technology producer and user;3 6 the
ability of the diffusion agent to absorb information and translate its applications
to specific firms; and the ability of the dissemination agents to legitimize the use
of the technology. Dissemination agents in the AES are backed by the resources
of the research subsystem and the expertise of the research specialists. This lends
technical credibility to the innovation, and reduces uncertainty concerning ef-
fects of its use;37 the ability of the extension or dissemination agent to act as an
exchange medium between the source of information (usually the state specialist)
and the user, and to deal interactively with problems that may occur during the
implementation of an innovation.
(3) Local involvement in diffusion efforts help censure effectiveness of tech-
nology transfer. The AES is typical of centralized diffusion systems where the
innovation flow is "top-down" from experiment station to extension agents to
individual farmers. However, through county planning councils, individual farm-
ers participate in the planning of extension efforts. 38 This gives program constitu-
ents an important sense of "ownership" of research results and ensures that
problems addressed are those felt to be most pressing by farmers.
(4) Extension agents act as "change agents." As the AES has evolved, the
assumption that it was sufficient for the county agent to grasp the content of
agricultural innovation has disappeared. It is now assumed that the county agent
must effectively communicate information concerning innovations and motivate
the farmer to adopt them. Since 1954, agents have been trained in communication
skills and received social science training emphasizing the diffusion process and
behavior change. 39 Extension agents have come to see themselves as "change
33. CENTER FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEV., supra note 21, at 26.
34. NAT'L SCIENCE FOUND., supra note 31, at 167.
35. See NAT'L SCIENCE FOUND., supra note 31, at 159-60 (citing a list of studies).
36. Research shows that potential users generally prefer, and make more effective use of, informa-
tion given directly by people rather than media. Id. at 160.
37. Rogers defines the agent as having "competence credibility.. .the degree to which a commu-
nication source or channel is perceived as knowledgeable and expert." See E. M. ROGERS, supra
note 27, at 328.
38. See Rogers, Aveland & Bean, supra note 25, at 28.
39. Id. at 39.
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agents" and to think in terms of "innovators, laggards, opinion leaders, and
stages in the innovation-decision process." 40 An agent might help a client under-
stand the need to change his behavior, motivate interest in innovations, or help
translate intent into action. 4' An agent might now choose an "opinion leader" in
a particular region, motivate that particular farmer to adopt an innovation, and
then, through the workings of peer pressure and identification, watch that innova-
tion quickly spread. Given the unwarranted resistance of many manufacturing
firms to innovation, this capacity to communicate effectively the benefits of
innovation and motivate behavior change is one of the most compelling argu-
ments for extending the Agricultural Extension model to industrial manufactur-
ing sectors.
There are, of course, differences between agriculture and manufacturing that
must be addressed before the Agricultural Extension model can be used in other
areas.
(1) Rivalrous competition in manufacturing might impede the effectiveness of
extending the Agricultural Extension model. Differential access to technical
knowledge does not give any particular farmer an advantage over another in
selling his crop. Farmers are not in "rivalrous competition" with one another.42 A
county agent usually faces no opposition if he wants to use a particular farmer's
field to demonstrate a new planting technique. Moreover, there is little opposition
to technical advice given to other farmers in the region. But in manufacturing,
firms are often in direct competition. Thus, individual firms may object to having
their workplace used as a demonstration site for a new manufacturing process.
Opposition may also develop to giving technical advice concerning manufactur-
ing processes which grant rival firms competitive advantages.
(2) Extension agents might be "spread too thin." The amount of knowledge
required could place tremendous pressure on the extension agents. AES agents
deal only with a single industry whose problems are fairly similar. The problems
of corn farmers in a particular region, for example, will be much alike. 43 An
industrial extension agent, on the other hand, may have to deal with different
problems across very dissimilar industries.
(3) There may be opposition to increased government intervention in re-
search and technology transfer. The government role in basic research has been
accepted for some time now. But there has been traditional opposition to govern-
ment involvement in applied research for industrial purposes other than agri-
culture. If the government were to become more involved in promoting
development and transfer of applied industrial research, ideological opposition
may develop.
(4) The task of extension would be made more difficult by the greater need to
adapt technology for specific firms. This point is related to point two above. Little
adaptation is required of agricultural innovations. Lettuce on one farm behaves
40. Id. at 40.
41. E.M. ROGERS, supra note 27, at 117.
42. R.R. Nelson, Government Stimulus of Technological Progress: Lessons From American His-
tory, in GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROCESS 466 (R.R. Nelson ed. 1982).
43. Rogers, Aveland & Bean, supra note 25, at 117.
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much like lettuce on other farms within a particular region. However, innovation
like CAD/CAM must be adapted to the specific characteristics and needs of
different firms in order to be used effectively. Demands on the resources of an
industrial extension effort would increase as a result.
B. The State Technical Services Act
The State Technical Services Act (STS) was a failed attempt in the 1960s to
apply portions of the Agricultural Extension model to manufacturing industries.
Personality conflicts between leading proponents of STS and members of Con-
gress reportedly played a major role in the program's termination in 1970. How-
ever, lessons can still be drawn from STS's short tenure.
The Office of State Technical Services began as the "Civil Industrial Tech-
nology Program" within the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1962. The origi-
nal aim was to stimulate research in lagging industries by giving direct grants for
research and development to manufacturing companies. Funding for fiscal year
1963 was only $1.6 million. 44 However, opposition to "allocation of Federal
funds for research in the private sector in competition with private dollars"
developed almost immediately.
45
In response to this opposition, Department of Commerce officials "turned
their attention to increasing industrial productivity through improved utilization
of existing technology." 46 To avoid criticism, STS was "conceived as a state
program operating primarily out of land grant colleges, with state funds matching
the federal dollars and state agencies establishing program priorities." ,
47
Many of STS's activities were based on existing programs in approximately 14
states. 4 The programs emphasized "consulta[tion], trouble-shooting, and short
training courses, and made use of field agents to help with client problems."
49
Although STS received a three-year legislative authorization, its appropriations
were "far below authorized levels." 50 Only $10 million was spent during the
three and one-half years of STS's operation."
According to one commentator, STS affected a variety of groups, many of
whom became directly involved in shaping the program. Among the groups were
the Association of Land-Grant Colleges, the industrial development agencies in
the states, a number of federal agencies including the Department of Agriculture,
the Economic Development Administration, the Small Business Administration,
and a variety of business, professional and engineering organizations.52
In its evaluation of the program, Arthur D. Little, Inc., a major consulting
firm, judged STS a qualified success. It found that the program had a positive
44. Id. at 111.
45. Id. at 111-12.
46. Id. at 112.
47. Id.




52. Id. at 112.
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benefit-to-cost ratio (based on positive effects on gross national product, employ-
ment, or increased competitiveness of U.S. products), and that the program was
"most helpful to small and medium size firms which do not have broad technical
and research capabilities." 53
However, major problems severely limited the positive impact that the program
might have had. As stated by the General Accounting Office, "[flederal funding
was too low and too short-lived to produce the structures needed to ensure
success. "4 The extent of federal expenditures was clearly inadequate to hire and
train staff sufficiently, particularly field agents, "who could provide the consis-
tent follow through that is essential to ensure any extension program's suc-
cess." 55 STS was given neither the resources for more than a few demonstration
projects, nor the opportunity to build the same kind of clientele network which
currently sustains the Agricultural Extension Service. Finally, the activities of
STS were limited largely to information dissemination. The need for adaptive
research-the "process of adapting a technique or process, to a particular local
situation"-limited STS's ability to help the firms it was designed to serve.
56
C. Other Technology Transfer Programs
A panoply of programs exist today which try to accelerate the rate at which
technology is adopted by industry. The most recent inventory identified 50 gov-
ernment technology transfer programs.57 However, most of these programs, like
the National Technical Information Service, use passive transfer mechanisms,
whose usefulness is limited by the inadequate technical resources of many firms.
They offer nothing in the way of adaptive research or strategies to promote
organizational change, nor do they act to ensure that technology is used in a way
that increases the competitive ability of the adopting firms.
A few federal technology transfer programs, however, do use active transfer
mechanisms.
(1) The Small Business Administration. In 1979 there were 16 Small Business
Administration (SBA) small business development centers around the country
(see Appendix 1). However, most SBA centers direct their assistance efforts
towards service and retail sectors and have had little impact on manufacturing
sectors. 5 8
(2) NASA Technology Utilization Program. The core of the Technology Uti-
lization Program (TUP) was created in 1961. Six Regional Dissemination Centers
at major universities around the country were employed to "screen technical
53. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE OFFICE OF STATE. TECHNICAL
SERVICES 8 (Report to the Office of Program Planning, Dep't of Commerce No. 9-35335, Oct. 1969).
54. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO Pad-83-22, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN FOSTERING UNIVER-
SITY-INDUSTRY COOPERATION 46 (1983).
55. Id.
56. Rogers, Aveland & Bean, supra note 25, at 115.
57. FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE, ENG'G AND TECHNOLOGY, DIRECTORY OF
FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 165 (1977).
58. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SIMILAR BUSINESS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF Two
FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE POTENTIAL FOR DUPLICATION at ii (1980) (draft).
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developments for possible applications, prepare technical briefs and other re-
ports, and assist potential users with problem formulation and information
search". 59 During the first ten years of its operation, funding for TUP was
approximately $9.5 million. In its peak year of 1972, TUP aided 3,100 clients.,
While there has been no systematic evaluation of the costs or benefits of the
program, industrial users appear to have been satisfied with the program. For
example, it is reported that Ford currently saves about $12 million per year with a
NASA-developed computer program for stress analysis in structural engineer-
ing. 61 With recent cutbacks in NASA funding, however, the technology transfer
program has all but disappeared.
Due to these cutbacks, the program is unlikely to have a significant impact on
manufacturing firms today. Several problems, however, limited the effectiveness
of the program. First, the technology offered had been developed for NASA's
needs rather than the needs of industrial users. Second, little was offered in the
way of adaptive engineering to help overcome the first problem. Finally, the
predominant users of its products were high technology companies; the program
did little to benefit technologically less sophisticated companies. One study
concluded that, overall, TUP diffused little technological innovation to its
clients.62
(3) Economic Development Administration University Centers. In 1979, 31
University Centers offered management and technical assistance to industrial
firms. (See Appendix I for list of Centers and fiscal year 1979 funding.) The
Centers have small core staffs of permanent professional employees who admin-
ister programs and participate in counseling and assisting business clients on
management and technical problems. Counseling is provided at no cost in most
cases. The Center generally counseled clients with business, business admin-
istration, finance, accounting, and marketing problems. Clients were mainly
small and medium-size retail, service, and manufacturing businesses.
63
As with the other programs, there are serious limitations on the effectiveness
of the EDA Centers. First, funding and overall levels of program activity are
insufficient for any significant impact to be felt. In 1980, total funding was only
$2.9 million. 64 All EDA Centers combined work with fewer than 2,000 clients a
59. Rogers, Aveland & Bean, supra note 25, at 115.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 115-16.
62. S.T. DOCTORS, THE NASA TECHNICAL TRANSFER PROGRAM: AN EVALUATION OF THE
DISSEMINATION SYSTEM 40 (1979).
63. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 58, at 2. As an example of the type of engineering/
technical assistance that a Center might offer, the GAO described one of the clients of the Georgia
Institute of Technology EDA Center:
[A] cellulose insulation manufacturing company needed a flame-retardant chemical mix for its
insulation. The services of the Chemical and Material Science Division of the Engineering
Experiment Station were used to determine which chemical mixes would work efficiently and
meet Federal Specification. A written report was provided which recommended certain mixes.
Id. at 14.
64. Id. at 1.
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year.6 Second, although clients are usually able to speak with individual coun-
selors, little effort is made to initiate client contact or promote organizational
change. Finally, the Centers offer different services and there is little coordina-
tion or systematic evaluation of their respective efforts.
D. The Current "Infrastructure" of Productivity Organizations
A team of researchers at the Georgia Institute of Technology recently finished a
compilation of the different organizations attempting to increase "productivity"
in the U.S. 66 Some of these organizations focus on technology, some on human
resources, some on management problems, and some on combinations of all
three. (See Appendix 2.) In order to define the universe of organizations included
in the compilation, the researchers examined each organization to determine
whether it was devoted primarily to productivity improvement in the public or the
private sector and whether it had local and national support and visibility, a
charter, or other formal authorization. 67
While 30 different organizations offered some combination of management or
technical assistance to private companies, the total number of employees was less
than 1,000.68 This figure contrasts vividly with the more than 15,000 currently
employed by the Agricultural Extension Service.
The range of services offered by these organizations varies. The Oregon Pro-
ductivity Center offers courses to improve business skills. 69 Others, like the
Manufacturing Productivity Center at the Illinois Institute of Technology, offer
training in the use of industrial robots and microcomputers.70 The approaches
used by these organizations to transfer technology vary as well. The Pennsylvania
Technical Assistance Program (PENNTAP), located at Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, uses the university's resources to solve problems that the client brings to the
program.7' The Georgia Productivity Center, located at the Georgia Institute of
Technology, gives greater attention to on-site visits, and relies on an extension
agent's own problem-solving expertise.72
The PENNTAP and Georgia Productivity Center programs have experienced
some measure of success. Using data based on a 40-50 percent response rate,
PENNTAP reported that it had produced benefits totaling approximately $52
million between 1972 and 1981. PENNTAP funding during that period was ap-
proximately $3.2 million. Thus the benefit-to-cost ratio was 16.2 to 1. Examining
65. This figure was calculated by extrapolating the 336 cases in 1979 for the six EDA University
Centers studied by the GAO to all 31 University Centers. Obviously, this extrapolated figure should
be used with caution. To my knowledge, no study has actually counted the clients of all 31 University
Centers.
66. D. Clifton, R. Yoos, W. Riall, Jr. & A. DeCurtis, The Productivity Infrastructure of the United
States (Jan. 1984) (U.S. Dep't of Commerce Grant No. 99-05-07129).
67. Id. at 13.
68. Id. at 23.
69. Id. at B-43.
70. Id. at B-59.
71. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 54, at 37.
72. Id.
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successful interaction between the Georgia Productivity Center extension service
and six client firms, Arthur D. Little, Inc. found that 300 jobs had been created
or saved by the extension service, resulting in a benefit-to-cost ratio of 22:2.1
3
Satisfactory evaluations have yet to be performed which would measure the
contribution of these organizations to increased manufacturing capability or vol-
ume of technology transferred.
Despite their qualified success, the impact of these organizations on the com-
petitiveness of U.S. manufacturing sectors is hampered by a variety of factors.
(1) Their resources are too limited. Funding and staffing limitations severely
diminish the effect that these programs might have. Studies have shown that
when ratios of clients to extension agents substantially exceed 500 to 1, effective-
ness diminishes.74 According to this standard, almost all agent to client ratios are
inadequate for the regions served.
(2) There are significant gaps in the geographic distribution of these pro-
grams. There are major portions of the country where no organizations offer
either management or technical assistance. Whole areas of the country go with-
out active efforts to diffuse new technologies.75
(3) The services offered by these organizations are inadequate. Some of
these organizations promote the use of new technologies. Some of them attempt
to improve the management of new and existing technologies. A few even offer
competitive analyses of the industries so that new technologies might be used
effectively. But virtually none do all three, and none make a serious effort to
promote behavioral change on the part of firms or attempt to motivate them to
adopt new technologies. Those organizations which attempt to diffuse new tech-
nologies rely on "technology push" strategies alone.
(4) A variety of important factors impede interaction among the organiza-
tions.76 Many of these organizations could benefit from the experience and exper-
tise of others. Yet there is little or no coordination or even interaction among
them. Some of them state that they are afraid to share information for fear that
business will be "swept out from under them if they share their methods and
information too easily." 7 7 And no objective standards exist against which the
procedures of these organizations can be evaluated.
Yet, many of the organizations in the Georgia Institute of Technology study
believed that their status would be enhanced through national affiliation. In their
view, the advantages that national affiliation would offer include:
increased visibility and recognition; combined resources; a sounding board for new
ideas; improved funding prospects; and a means by which performance standards
could be defined and productivity awareness raised.7"
73. Id. at 40-41. The methods of calculating benefit-to-cost ratios cited in this paragraph are
somewhat questionable. Therefore, final figures should be used with caution.
74. Rogers, Aveland & Bean, supra note 25, at 121.
75. CLIFTON, THE PRODUCTIVITY INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE U.S. 31.
76. This section draws on D. Clifton, R. Yoos, W. Riall, Jr. & A. DeCurtis, supra note 66, at
50-5I.
77. Id. at 51.
78. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There is a pressing need for a substantial new effort to promote the use of
advanced manufacturing technologies. American firms are failing to compete
successfully along a variety of dimensions-efficiency, quality, flexibility, and
others-for reasons having little to do with the exchange rate, cost of labor, or
current "state of the economy." Sophisticated applications of new technologies
can improve manufacturing performance in a wide range of industries, but organ-
izational resistance to change, characteristic shortcomings of small and medium-
size firms, and other economic factors have slowed the adoption of new technolo-
gies to a rate that is not in the national interest. Existing efforts to improve
manufacturing are inadequate but point to the potential benefits of a new institu-
tional effort, and the need for additional coordination and funding.
The Agricultural Extension Services model serves as an effective starting point
for a program that could substantially improve American manufacturing perform-
ance. By using an active mode of technology transfer, organizational change
strategies, and local planning councils, the model meets a number of the criteria
established in Part II for the effective promotion of new technologies. Applying
the AES model to the manufacturing sector would greatly benefit the American
economy. The successful application of the model, however, will require
thoughtful treatment of a number of problems.
An Industrial Extension Service (IES) would improve the performance of
American manufacturing.7 9 The IES would be loosely based on the Agricultural
Extension Service model, and would include the use of a research subsystem,
extension agents, and research specialists.
The following recommendations will serve as a framework for dealing with the
more detailed problems of program design and implementation:
(1) Industrial Research Centers should be established at major universities
around the country to provide a continuing source of new information concerning
production technologies. Research Centers would concentrate research on a lim-
ited number of areas chosen by local planning councils. In one region, a Re-
search Center might concentrate on robotics; in another, on problems of the
mining industry. In many cases, the Research Centers could be based at schools
participating in the EDA University Center Program or already existing state
programs. In other cases, the Research Centers would have to be established
without the assistance of an existing organization. Research Centers should be
distributed in all 50 states on the basis of industrial concentration so that all
geographic areas receive adequate services.
(2) The IES should utilize extension agents to actively transfer technology to
local manufacturing firms. Extension agents would increase client understanding
and use of new technologies through lectures, demonstrations, and on-site con-
sultations. The qualifications of extension agents backed by a research team and
79. While I highlight the use of the JES to promote the diffusion and effective use of production
technologies, it might also be used to improve the performance of small and medium-sized firms in
additional management areas. This additional possibility is a legitimate area for policy consideration.
See also CENTER FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEV., supra note 21, at 1-13, 79-90, 107-09.
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the use of demonstrations would reduce doubts about the technical feasibility of
new innovations. The ability of clients to evaluate effects on profitability would
be enhanced by agents pointing out the competitive advantages and disadvantages
of the innovations. The familiarity of the agent with the client's problems, as well
as the use of demonstrations at firms having similar characteristics, would assure
clients that use of an innovation would improve profitability. In order to help the
firm make the most effective use of its new capabilities, agents would also
provide assistance to departments such as personnel, finance, and marketing, that
might be disrupted by the introduction of new technologies.
The scope of services should include competitive analysis of industries as well
as general business assistance. Mere use of advanced technologies is not suffici-
ent to improve competitive performance. Competitive analysis of an industry
would help an agent decide if the use of advanced technologies is appropriate,
which technologies should be adopted, and how technologies should be used.
The industrial extension agents should take note of the increasing emphasis the
AES has placed on the role of extension agents as "change agents." Through a
variety of strategies designed to promote behavior change, individual extension
agents could increase the willingness of manufacturing clients to use innovations.
Agents would employ organizational change strategies to motivate adoption of
technologies and assist clients with adaptive engineering.
Agents should be kept up to date on the latest technologies through con-
ferences and in-house training sessions at the Research Centers. They should also
receive ongoing instruction in effective communication and change strategies.
(3) Research specialists should link extension agents to new technologies
and expertise in business analysis. Technical experts would keep extension
agents informed of the latest technological developments. They would also pro-
vide answers to complex technical questions and conduct research in response to
the requests of local planning councils or client needs. Business specialists would
provide the expertise necessary to aid firm departments particularly affected by
the adoption of new technology. For example, a staff accountant might help a
client develop new procedures for allocating overhead necessitated by the use of
CAD/CAM equipment, or a specialist in process planning might help a client
develop a more efficient production path for the use of numerically-controlled
machine tools. Specialists possessing particular skills in the competitive analysis
of industries would be available to assist the extension agents in making recom-
mendations for the effective use of new technologies.
(4) The program should be given adequate time and funding to attain and
prove its effectiveness. Chronically inadequate funding has limited efforts to
transfer technology. Successful application of the extension model to manufactur-
ing will require sufficient funding to provide an adequate range and level of
services. In addition, the program must be given adequate time to recruit and
train agents and enable agents to develop a clientele network and familiarity with
client problems.
During the past decade, the Agricultural Extension Service has received more
than $450 million per year in total funding and continually employed more than
15,000 people. These figures should be considered minimum benchmarks for the
Industrial Extension Service. In addition, appropriations for the Industrial Exten-
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sion Service should be approved for at least a five year period. This time span
should be considered the absolute minimum necessary for the program to attain
effective operating levels anywhere near that of the Agricultural Extension Ser-
vice.
Ultimately, program capacity must be sufficient to make a significant impact
on the overall performance of American manufacturing. To avoid overburdening
the first extension agents, however, program capacity must be expanded care-
fully; even a five year period may not be sufficient.
(5) Local planning councils made up of business, government, labor, and the
Research Centers representatives should direct local extension efforts toward a
limited number of technologies or industries. This will prevent program re-
sources from being overwhelmed. Cooperative direction of extension efforts will
ensure that assistance is directed toward those industries that local interests
believe are important and will encourage local support. Cooperative participation
by local manufacturing firms will help defuse concern about misguided or un-
wanted government "intervention."
(6) To prevent the overburdening of program resources, agents should not be
forced to deal with too many clients or too many industries. Agricultural exten-
sion agents deal with a relatively homogeneous group of clients in a single
industry. Manufacturing extension agents will need to possess knowledge of a
large number of different industries. In addition, manufacturing innovations re-
quire more adaptation to individual firms than agricultural innovations. Since the
effectiveness of an AES agent declines when the client-to-agent ratio exceeds
500:1, a client-to-agent ratio of 100:1 should be considered an absolute
maximum.
(7) The federal government should take the lead by matching state and
county government funds and providing overall coordination of the program.
Federal matching funds for the IES would help ensure adequate funding. Match-
ing arrangements would also ensure that all three levels of government are com-
mitted to the program. An appropriate federal agency should also coordinate the
efforts of the various Research Centers. Within the current "infrastructure" of
productivity organizations, effective methods of providing assistance to client
and special technical expertise often go unshared. The federal agency should
promote cooperation between the Research Centers and promulgate objective
standards by which extension efforts could be evaluated.
(8) A data network should be established between the Research Centers. An
electronic link between the Research Centers would allow them to share as-
sistance methods and obtain answers to technical problems beyond their particu-
lar expertise. Eventually the data network could be expanded to include
information in existing passive information systems like the National Technical
Information Service.
(9) A strong effort must be made to obtain the support of interested groups
for the idea and methods of an Industrial Extension Service. One of the lessons of
both the Agricultural Extension Service and the State Technical Services Act is
that the support of interested groups, particularly those in the private sector, plays
a crucial role in determining such a program's success.
It may be difficult to obtain adequate support for applying the extension model
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to manufacturing. There is a traditional bias in the private sector against pro-
grams that appear to increase government intervention. Certain industries may
oppose the program because it assists competing sectors. On the other hand,
clients of current productivity organizations and a number of the organizations
that participated in shaping the State Technical Services Act would provide a
natural political base for establishing an Industrial Extension Service. In addi-
tion, a number of the industries whose performance in world markets has deterio-
rated in recent years-like machine tools and textiles-might also be in favor of
the concept.
Adequate support for the program is important to its potential enactment, and
confidence in its methods is necessary for it to be fully effective.80 Supportive
local trade associations and planning councils could help obtain demonstration
sites for production technologies and increase participation in IES activities.
The attention now focused upon the effects of exchange rates, labor, and
capital costs on the U.S. trade position can be justified only if at least equivalent
attention is paid to improving the performance of American industries within the
constraints of those economic factors. A carefully planned Industrial Extension
Service is an important first step in redressing the current imbalance in both our
trade position and the focus of our policy deliberations.
80. It may be difficult to convince some firms of the advisability of some extension methods. For
example, firms may not be willing to allow their factories to be used as demonstration sites to be
viewed by rivals.
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